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The European Policy Unit at the European University 
Institute was created to further three main goals. First, to 
continue the development of the European University Institute as 
a forum for critical discussion of key items on the Community 
agenda. Second, to enhance the documentation available to 
scholars of European affairs. Third, to sponsor individual 
research projects on topics of current interest to the European 
Communities. Both as in-depth background studies and as policy 
analyses in their own right, these projects should prove 
valuable to Community policy-making. 
PREFACE 
This report explores the possibilities of transferring 
organizational and procedural structures of The Great Lakes water 
quality policies to other regions with similar environmental problems. 
Exploratory in nature, this report describes the policy making process 
regarding the Great Lakes, summarizes the viewpoints of various policy 
actors, and attempts to draw some general conclusions about the policy 
process and its transferabili ty . 
The data for this report was compiled from three different 
sources: official documents and other literatlJre, telephone interviews 
with key actors, and personal interviews with several actors involved. 
The interviews were not standardized and no attempt was made to 
draw a representative sample of all relevant parties. The collected data 
from the interviews were subjectively processed by the authors and 
interpreted according to their knowledge and analytical framework. In 
some instances during the report, interview statements are identified 
as being drawn from a specific person; in other instances the 
statements were indirectly used as evidence for an observation or 
conclusion. In this case the impersonal statements "From. the interviews 
we learned" or "the interviews revealed" were used. We have provided 
all interview partners with a copy of this report and asked them to 
verify all direct quotes or interview summaries. 
We would like to thank all our interview partners. in particularly 
Barry Boyer, Warren Flynt. and Philip Weller. They have provided us 
with valuable information and shared with us their concerns, 
expectations, and evaluations of the process. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
As human ability to impact the environment has increased, due 
to technological advances and increasing population size, the geographic 
extent of such impacts has expanded as well. Transnational pollution 
and the degradation of common areas is a concern that has been 
gaining increasing attention. It has become abundantly clear that a 
solution to such transnational problems necessitates international 
cooperation, either regional, bi-national, multinational, or global in 
scope. Since political boundaries do not respect geographic features, 
there are many instances where resources are shared between two or 
more nations. Traditionally such resources are used by each nation 
without regard to the needs of, or consequences to other nations. Of 
major concern are the synergistic or multiplicative effects that may 
result from such independent, but multi-party usage. For one nation to 
change policies or curtail activity independently for the good of such a 
common area would result in an unequal distribution of the burden, 
with questionable results. Therefore, it is necessary for all affected 
parties to work together towards a common agreement regarding the 
short and long term destiny of shared resources. 
While the overall goal, such as improved environmental quality 
or bio-diversity, may be agreed upon, the actual mechanisms for 
attaining such goals are often illusive. Setting standards, providing for 
monitoring, agreeing on enforcement, and implementation are all 
extremely difficult with multiple stakeholders. Since environmental 
quality in itself is not a natural constant, but relies on a cultural 
definition, the question of what is worth protecting and what is an 
inevitable by-product of human activities cannot be answered in an 
unequivocal manner. In some instances, policy makers in different 
countries have adopted a policy of restoring the environmental quality 
of a special region or area to its appearance before human intervention. 
This has been done, for example, for some of the natural park areas in 
the Unites States. In other instances, policy makers pursue a concept 
that attempts to combine economic activity and the preservation of 
natural ecosystem functions (usually referred to as sustainable 
development). Finally, environmental quality has at times been defined 
as nothing more than a prerequisite for economic or other human 
activities (Brickman and lIgen 1982). The cultural emphasis given to 
environmental quality is also dependent on the stage of economic 
development and standard of living. In a country, where basic needs 
for individuals are still not met, environmental protection is usually not 
on the priority list of public policies. At the same time, it has become 
clear that the neglect leading to environmental degradation in one area 
may lead to detrimental effects in another area and may even impact 
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national or global living conditions (for example, deforestation, water 
use, or the release of carbon dioxide). 
The need for reaching international agreements on environmental 
quality is crucial given these interdependencies of local pollution and 
translocal effects. In addition to general multinational negotiations, 
such as the Montreal conference on ozone destruction, agreements 
between the users of shared resources are an effective strategy to 
combine a nation's self interest with the overall goal of environmental 
protection. Such an agreement can only be achieved, if the political 
representatives in each country or region can find a consensus 
regarding the need to work together and make a commitment to 
allocate the resources necessary to attain the common goal. Each 
country has its own economic and environmental agenda and priorities 
regarding the necessity of committing resources to achieving the goals 
of an international agreement. In addition, within each country there 
are numerous interests that must be accounted for, including regional 
and local political entities, governmental agencies, industry, citizen 
groups, and persons directly dependent on the resource in question for 
livelihood. Depending on the form of government and the political 
culture. each nation has developed different structures and 
mechanisms for coordination between these various stakeholder groups 
(O'Riordan and Wynne 1987; Bauman and Renn 1988). 
The nature of environmental problems is characterized by 
complex cause-effect relationships. interconnecting dependencies, and 
uncertainty about the magnitude of effects within and beyond the 
environment studied. The evolving knowledge regarding these linkages 
requires that the solutions are not just political in nature. Scientific 
analysis must be integrated into the policy process in order that the 
policy reflect the scientific knowledge as well as allow for change as 
new information becomes available. At the same time, however. science 
cannot replace the political process of defining the goals and objectives 
of environmental protection and of allocating monetary or legal 
resources of society to specific tasks. These philosophical and economic 
issues cannot be relegated to scientists; they require political decision 
making. 
In most democratic societies. it is not sufficient to collect the best 
available scientific knowledge and to use this knowledge as a basis for 
the political decision making by the legitimate representatives (as 
assumed in the decisionistic model). Rather the policies must reflect an 
intricate political process in which elected officials, stakeholders. and 
representatives of citizen groups jointly develop appropriate policies. 
Socio-economic concerns as well as public values have to be an integral 
part of any policy agreement. Given that successful implementation will 
depend on the cooperation of the affected parties, it is necessary that 
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such an agreement reflect the desires and values of all relevant social 
groups. It is hence necessary to integrate scientific expertise, political 
authority, and social interests and values into the decision making 
process in order to compose environmental policies that are technically 
feasible, politically implementable, and socially acceptable. 
The integration of these three entities is difficult enough to 
accomplish on a local or national level, but it has been an almost 
insurmountable task in the past to accomplish harmonization of 
environmental policy across national borders. Not only are different 
stakeholder groups involved and different objectives pursued, but the 
style of regulation and policy making may also vary from one country 
to another. In spite of these problems, the opportunities for 
improvement in international cooperation on all three levels (science, 
politics, and stakeholders) have grown in recent decades, for three 
primary reasons: 
1. The negative effects of environmental pollution are affecting all 
stakeholders so that the problem itself, or the crisis created by 
the problem, drives the actors to agree on common responses. 
2. The internationalization of the scientific community and of many 
stakeholder groups (Le. industry and unions) along with growing 
international cooperation on the political level has created a 
common understanding of the problem and facilitated the insight 
that non-cooperation is a lose-lose situation for almost all 
participants. 
3. Environmental degradation has become a major political issue in 
most countries. Performance on environmental questions is now 
an important yardstick for evaluating politicians and political 
parties in regional and national elections. Public pressure has 
placed environmental problems at the top of the priority list of 
concerns in most industrialized countries. 
This papers analyzes the political structure and decision making 
processes for environmental policies with respect to the Great Lakes, an 
area that is shared by the United States and Canada. These two 
countries, encompassing eight States within the Unites States and one 
Province within Canada, border at least one of the Great Lakes. An 
integrated approach to environmental regulation of the Lakes and to 
joint clean-up efforts is necessary to improve water quality. Integrated 
policies require cooperation of all constituencies. The institutional 
mechanisms to initiate and enforce coordination among the various 
actors and across jurisdictions are the focus of this paper. In addition, 
the functional and conceptual foundations of the various agreements 
are discussed. At the end, the paper will discuss the potential of the 
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Great Lakes policy program to serve as a role model for similar types of 
areas or problems, specifically the Mediterranean region. The analysis 
will reveal that the Great Lakes Region embodies both the problems 
that have lead to the environmental degradation, as well as some of the 
most innovative mechanisms developed to alleviate these problems. 
2 THE GREAT LAKES BASIN AS A MODEL 
2.1 The Great Lakes Water Quality 
The Great Lakes are comprised of five lakes; Superior, Michigan, 
Huron, Erie, and Ontario (see Figure 1). Together they hold 20% of the 
world's supply of fresh water. The Great Lakes Water Quality 
Agreements apply to all five lakes as well as the connecting channels 
and the St. Lawrence River to the point where the River ceases to form 
the international boundary. The concept of the ecosystem basin refers 
to all land areas that drain iDlO the Great Lakes. 
Human interactions and dependence on the Great Lakes goes back 
for centuries, with the impacts escalating as population increases. 
Currently the Great Lakes Basin is home to 335 million Americans and 
Canadians (Conservation Foundation 1989). The degradation of the 
water quality is a function of both human usage as well as natural 
characteristics of the Lakes that make them especially vulnerable to 
pollution. This vulnerability is the result of the extremely long 
residence times of the water, and therefore, the pollutants in the lakes. 
Less than one percent of the total volume of water in the Great Lakes 
system flows to the ocean each year (EPA, Great Lakes National 
Program Office, 1988). This allows pollutants introduced by human 
activity to accumulate and concentrate. The replacement time varies for 
each lake with Lake Erie having the shortest retention time of 2.6 years 
and Lake Superior having the longest replacement time of 191 years 
(Michigan Sea Grant College Program, 1990). In addition, the lakes and 
the flows are such that one lake flows into another in a cascading effect 
until the St. Lawrence River is reached. While all of the Lakes have the 
Lakes have been degraded due to human activity, the extent and the 
exact nature vary for each lake depending on the type of activity most 
prevalent, the natural characteristics of the lake and the location in the 
chain as the water flows towards the St. Lawrence River. 
Lake Erie was the first lake to show visible signs of degradation. 
The introduction of excess nutrients from improperly treated 
wastewater caused eutrophication due to the increased productivity of 
algae growth. This decreased the visual quality of the water and 
depleted the oxygen levels in the water, resulting in a mass killing of 
fish. By 1972 the scientific community was convinced that the limiting 
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FIGURE 1: Map of the Great Lake Basin 
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nutrient was phosphorus and this was targeted in the 1972 Great Lakes 
Water Quality agreement and all successive agreements (EPA, Great 
Lakes National Program Office, 1988). Problems caused by nutrient 
loading are not completely solved, but are now considered to be under 
control. Current focus is on toxic pollutants. 
The problem of toxic pollutants was identified in the 1960s along 
with the eutrophication problem, but has proven to be much more 
persistent and remains the most important issue regarding water 
quality. Over 1,000 chemicals have been detected in the Great Lakes 
(Great Lakes Water Quality Board, 1987). Many of these chemicals have 
been labeled as carcinogens, mutagens, and teratogens based on 
exposure of laboratory animals (Great Lakes Water Quality Board, 
1983). Clean-up efforts have produced mixed results. The 
concentrations of some chemicals are decreasing, while for others an 
increase has been seen. 
As the persistence of these chemicals has lead to beller scientific 
understanding of the sources and paths of the chemicals, it has become 
clear that policy targeting just the water will not result in improved 
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water quality. The existence of toxics deposited from land use activities, 
such as agriculture, seepage from improper disposal, airborne sources, 
and disturbed sediment, has brought about the current emphasis on a 
basin wide ecosystem approach. 
Since the 1972 Water Quality Agreement, both Canada and the 
United Sates, under guidance from the International Joint Commission, 
have devoted considerable effort to accomplishing the pre-defined 
goals. Between 1972 and 1985 both countries reduced nutrient loading 
from municipal sewage treatment facilities such that the goal of 1 mg/l 
has been accomplished for Lakes Ontario and Erie. For the United 
States this was an 80% reduction in phosphorus loadings. (EPA, Great 
Lakes National Program Office, 1988). These successes are reflected in 
the clearer water and the return of desirable fish species to these 
lakes. 
2.2 The Model Character of The Great Lakes (or Other Regions 
The environmental problems experienced by the Great Lakes, as 
well as the complications resulting from bi-national jurisdiction are not 
dissimilar to those experienced by the Mediterranean Sea. Both are 
large bodies of water that have multi-purpose uses, including shipping, 
transportation, recreatioll. and basic subsistence. Jurisdiction is 
dispersed among different countries with different values and 
regulatory styles. While the United States basically follows an 
adversarial route to setting environmental standards and composing 
environmental policies, Canada pursues a more European style of 
regulation, which is characterized by a strong preference for consensual 
agreements among all stakeholders and a conflict resolution process 
through negotiations in committees (O'Riordan 1985; Renn 1989). 
Although policy styles vary considerably among the Mediterranean 
countries and may not be comparable to either Canada or the United 
States, the political mechanism to build a policy making structure that 
is capable of integrating different regulatory styles may serve as a 
starting point for building similar structures around the Mediterranean 
Sea. The value of studying institutions and mechanisms to achieve 
ecosystem redevelopment in regions with similar problems, but 
dissimilar political structures has been demonstrated in a previous 
study comparing the Great Lakes institutional development with that of 
the Baltic Sea (Francis, 1988). 
Scientific analysis has played a key role in policy formation 
within the Great Lakes arena, and it can be expected that such a role 
will be necessary in achieving consensus among the nations 
surrounding the Mediterranean Sea as well. The international character 
of the scientific communities and the universalism of science in terms 
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of methodology and problem structuring have facilitated coordination 
of policies in the past and served as a major integrative force for 
finding international standards and defining multinational policies 
(Bauman and Renn 1989). The role that science advisory councils have 
played in designing and evaluating environmental policies in the Great 
Lakes arena, may be one of the structural mechanisms that would be 
the least difficult to transfer from the North-American to the European 
arena. 
At the same time, however, there are differences that might 
serve as caveats against the direct transfer of lessons learned with the 
Great Lakes to the Mediterranean Sea. The most glaring difference, of 
course, is the number of nations involved and therefore the number of 
stakeholders impacted. In addition, there is a higher degree of diversity 
among the nations surrounding the Mediterranean Sea, especially with 
regard to economic strength and political/social structures. Whereas the 
United States and Canada have a history of cooperation, this is not the 
case with many of the Mediterranean Sea countries. Any problems 
associated with the bi-national or bi-cultural aspects of the Great 
Lakes will be exacerbated by the multinational, multi-cultural nature of 
the countries bordering the Mediterranean Sea. The basic philosophy 
towards nature and conservation also constitutes a major difference 
between the environmentally conscious citizenship in the U.S. and 
Canada and their counterparts in Southern Europe, North Africa, and 
the Middle East. The commitment to and values regarding the quality of 
the environment are dramatically different among the stakeholders in 
both areas. 
Therefore the underlying assumption that the policies of the 
Great Lakes can serve as a model for the Mediterranean countries has 
to be taken with caution. Some mechanisms of coordination may well 
be suitable for the political cultures of the Mediterranean countries, 
others may not. This paper will close with a discussion of some of the 
lessons learned from the Great Lakes that appear to be transferable to 
the Mediterranean situation while others may be too country-specific 
or region-specific to be of substantial value to other areas. Of particular 
value is an exploration into the mechanisms developed for the clean-up 
and continued maintenance of the Great Lakes, since similar 
mechanisms, derived from scientific knowledge and technical 
innovations, will prove beneficial to the implementation of water 
quality policies for the Mediterranean Sea. There are a number of 
programs and approaches to the Great Lakes clean-up that may provide 
some insight into generic concepts and procedural advice for a 
Mediterranean Sea clean-up and maintenance program. 
The history of cooperation regarding the Great Lakes spans seven 
decades, with almost two decades of policy directed towards the quality 
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of the water and the maintenance of the ecosystem. Growing awareness 
of the extent of human impact on the Lakes has been mirrored by an 
escalation in the scope of the policy and the perspective of the tasks 
associated with each step of the clean-up and regulation. This has been 
accompanied by an evolution in the working arrangements between the 
various stakeholders in order to effectuate policy that is capable of 
accounting for the divergent needs of the stakeholders, while at the 
same time accomplishing the desires of the impacted parties. 
There have been, and will continue to be, numerous adjustments 
and realignments in policy as the decision makers seek to reach an 
optimal solution. The fact that the optimal solution has not, and may 
never be reached should not be viewed in a negative light. The goals 
and needs of society change and these changes should be mirrored by 
modifications in the goals of the policy. Given the long history of 
cooperation regarding the Great Lakes, it is hoped that others in a 
similar situation may be able to learn from both the successes and 
failures of the program, in order to obtain an understanding of what 
institutions and mechanisms are effective when instituting policy 
regarding shared natural resources. 
3. COOPERATIVE INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS 
3.1 Historical Overview 
The initial policy concerns regarding the Great Lakes were 
confined to water management issues. A growing environmental ethic 
among citizens in both Canada and the United States, as well as obvious 
pollution and the degradation of the aesthetic quality of the Lakes, 
triggered the launching of a new phase in the cooperative history 
between Canada and the United States. The tremendous number of 
chemicals being manufactured and the ability of science to detect lower 
and lower levels of contamination, along with a growing awareness of 
such issues as bio-accumulation and the interdependencies among 
species, has lead to the most recent phase of the Great Lakes 
cooperative water quality policy. The underlying theme of this most 
recent phase has been the concept of the Great Lakes Basin as an 
ecosystem. The clean-up of toxics in the ecosystem and the prevention 
of add}tional toxic discharges into the Lakes are two areas where 
important cooperative policy initiatives have been undertaken. 
The evolution of policy agreements, from a narrow water 
management perspective to a broader ecosystem outlook, can be seen 
as reflective of the interactions between the policy makers, the citizens, 
and scientists. There are many issues of concern regarding the Great 
Lakes that have been the subject of bi-national discussions, such as 
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navigation, water diversions, fluctuations in the water levels, the 
introduction of foreign species, and accidents with hazardous 
substances (IJC,1988). Many of these issues have been addressed by 
the International loint Commission, a policy body established in 1909. 
As a matter of necessity, the scope of this paper will be limited to a 
characterization of the Great Lakes clean-up and maintenance programs 
as a model for cooperative programs and policies. 
A study of the institutions and mechanisms that evolve from any 
policy requires a dual focus. First, it is necessary to understand the 
agreements that have been signed, given the multinational orientation. 
Second, it is necessary to look at the implementation of the agreements 
by the affected parties and the institutional arrangements that evolved 
to accomplish the goals. 
3.2. International Agreements 
In 1909 a treaty between the United States and Great Britain 
was signed in which the questions of water quantity management and 
waterway transportation on the Great Lakes were addressed. The 1909 
Boundary Waters Treaty was the first bi-national agreement regarding 
the Great Lakes. The primary topics addressed were navigation, 
assurance of equal and unrestrained passage for citizens of both 
countries, and a hierarchical listing of preferred uses of the water 
(Treaty, Article VIII, 1909). The International loint Commission (IJC) 
was established under this agreement. The IJC is still in existence and 
has become a key player in the water quality issue. 
Although the dominant topic of concern in this treaty is water 
management and not water quality, Article IV did address the problem 
of water pollution, noting that "waters flowing across the boundary 
shall not be polluted on either side to the injury of health or property 
on the other" (Treaty, 1909). The IJC first dealt with the issue of 
pollution in 1912 when the Governments of Canada and the United 
States asked the Commission to examine the extent and causes of 
pollution, specifically with regard to waterborne diseases like typhoid 
fever and cholera (IJC, Remedial Action Plans, 1989). Recommendations 
from the IJC regarding water purification eventually lead to the 
elimination of waterborne epidemics in the the Great Lakes Basin. 
Water quality issues were not given priority under the Boundary 
Waters Treaty, but the agreement served to set a precedent for 
cooperation that has been crucial in subsequent negotiations. The 
Boundary Waters Treaty is still in force today. 
Water quality issues became the major focus (If a subsequent 
agreement reached in 1972. In this agreement, the United States and 
Canada formulated goals and policies for Great Lakes Water Quality 
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(Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement. 1972). The shift in focus from 
water management to water quality reflected a growing environmental 
awareness in both Canada and the United States. Public concern 
regarding the degradation of the Lakes and a report released by the IIC 
in 1970 on the quality of the Great Lakes water were both major 
factors in the negotiations towards this agreement (Agreement 
preamble. 1972). The agreement focused on the aesthetic aspects of the 
water. The dominant issues were eutrophication caused by nutrient 
loading and visual debris. The water quality objectives. as outlined in 
Article II. stipulated that the waters should be free of floating debris. 
oil. scum. nutrients that create nuisance growths. toxics and any other 
unsightly or deleterious materials. The following sources of pollution 
were directly addressed; industrial. agricultural. forestry and other 
land use activities. shipping and dredging activities. and pollution from 
municipal wastewater discharge (Agreement. Article IV. 1972). 
This agreement not only reaffirmed the 1909 Boundary Waters 
Treaty. but it extended the scope of the IJC. including a provision that 
both countries were obliged to report on their activities towards 
compliance with the agreement. The IJC was instructed to establish a 
Great Lakes Water Quality Board to assist in fulfilling the obligations of 
the IJC under this agreement. The Water Quality Board consists of the 
heads. or their substitutes. of the Federal. State. and the Provincial 
(State equivalents in Canada) environmental agencies or departments. 
The 1972 agreement was re-assessed in 1978 which lead to a 
new agreement between the United States and Canada. Under this new 
agreement the Boundary Waters Treaty remained in effect and the 
goals and objectives of the 1972 agreement were assimilated. The scope 
of concern here. while including the previous water quality goals. 
expanded with additional emphasis on toxic chemicals and other 
hazardous substances. Observations of wildlife deformations resulting 
from anthropogenic substances and the advances in the ability of 
science to detect trace amounts of chemicals in the Great Lakes and 
beyond had alerted the public as well as the political stakeholder 
groups and created sufficient political pressure in both countries to 
place the issue on the agenda of the IJC meetings. Public outrage was 
further fueled by the fact that more chemicals (in absolute quantities) 
were being released into the Basin ecosystem. Citizens feared that the 
quality of their lives would be permanently impacted and the sport 
fishing industry. a major economic source of income at the Great Lakes. 
was threatened by the prospect of fish contamination and loss of 
revenues. 
In response to political pressure. the signatories of the 1978 
agreement promised to restore and maintain the chemical. physical. 
and biological integrity of the waters of the Great Lakes Basin 
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Ecosystem. This new goal required a shift from the pollution control 
perspective to a more integrative ecosystem approach. In Article II the 
Agreement states: "The purpose of the Parties is to restore and 
maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the waters of 
the Great Lake Basin Ecosystem" (IJC, Great Lakes Water Quality 
Agreement, 1978). The quality of the Great Lakes Basin was viewed as 
an integrated system of cross-media indicators, including air pollution, 
land use, agricultural practices, water use and pollution, and effects on 
living organisms in and around the Great Lakes. In addition, the 
concept of zero discharge regarding toxic substances was introduced. 
The role of the IJC was again conftrmed and expanded. 
To support the activities of the IJC and to assess and evaluate 
scientiftc information for the Water Quality Board and the Commission, 
a new group, the Great Lakes Science Advisory Board, was established. 
In addition, a Great Lakes Regional OffIce of the International loint 
Commission was added in order to assure administrative support for 
the IJC and the two Boards, to organize public information programs, 
and to conduct public hearings (IJC, Great Lakes Water Quality 
Agreement, Article VIII, 1988). 
Almost ten years later, in 1987 the agreement of 1978 was 
amended. This amendment was designed to facilitate implementation of 
arrangements previously stipulated and to address new issues. In order 
to facilitate implementation, specific programs were outlined as well as 
timetables for compliance. New issues of concern that were addressed 
included atmospheric deposition of toxic pollutants onto the surface 
water, contaminated sediments, groundwater contamination, and non-
point sources of pollutants. Two important vehicles for the 
implementation of the goals were the Remedial Action Plans (RAPs) 
and the Lakewide Management Plans. Areas that had previously been 
identifted as "hot spots" are obliged to complete a Remedial Action Plan 
for improving the environmental situation in these speciftc locations 
label1ed as Areas of Concern. The agreement on Lakewide Management 
Plans mandated that the two countries should compose hi-national 
strategic plans for all the lakes except Lake Michigan where the United 
States has sole jurisdiction. These plans are to address lakewide critical 
pollutants. The focus of these programs is on the clean-up of existing 
pol1ution and the achievement of a goal of zero discharge of toxic 
pollutants in the future. 
3.3 Agreements between Federal and State/Provincial Level 
To accomplish the goals set forth in the international agreements, 
cooperation and support of the eight affected U.S. States and the 
province of Ontario must be assured. While the Federal governments of 
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the two countries signed the agreements, the actual implementation has 
been left to the state and local governments. 
Regarding the cooperation within the United States, there are no 
agreements between the Federal government and any of the States 
specifically addressing the implementation of the Great Lakes Water 
Quality Agreements. Furthermore, the Federal government does not 
allocate any funds in direct association with the obligations that the 
United States committed to when signing the Great Lakes Water Quality 
Agreement and its amendments (Kent Fuller, personal communication). 
There is currently a bill in the Senate that would legislate many of the 
components of the Water Quality Agreement, but it is unclear whether 
federal funding is provided to the States to implement the bill (Great 
Lakes United, Action Update, 1990). 
In contrast to the United States, the federal government of 
Canada and the government of the Province of Ontario have entered 
into an agreement to further the goals set forth in the Water Quality 
Agreements. This agreement. the Canada Ontario Agreement Respecting 
Great Lakes Water Quality (COA) was first signed in 1971. It has since 
been reaffirmed and is still in force. In addition to coordinating several 
committees serving as institutional links between the Canadian 
Government and the Province of Ontario, this agreement also provides 
for funds to fulfill the international obligations. The Federal and 
Provincial governments have agreed to share the costs incurred by the 
Province in implementing the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement. In 
1989-90 the combined contributions was not to exceed 3, 740. 000 
Canadian dollars (Federal Signing Authority). 
3.4 Inter-State and Provincial Agreements 
On the Canadian side of the Great Lakes. Ontario is the only 
province that directly borders the Lakes. Quebec encompasses some of 
the St. Lawrence River, and therefore is also concerned with the quality 
of the Great Lakes water. Because the majority of the jurisdiction on the 
Canadian side is within one province. there has been no need for inter-
provincial agreements. 
In the United States, eight states share at least some of the 
coastlines of the Great Lakes and are interested in regulating and 
preserving the environmental quality of the Lakes. These eight states 
formed the Council of Great Lakes Governors in 1983, a non-profit 
organization to integrate the policy -and goals of the member states 
regarding the Great Lakes (Great Lakes. Great Future). While Ontario 
and Quebec are not party to this agreement, they have been invited to 
participate in the studies and activities that the Council has undertaken. 
In 1985 the Council signed the Great Lakes Charter. This agreement, 
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recogmzmg that the Great Lakes transcend political boundaries, 
stipulates that the states must work together to preserve and maintain 
the water in the Great Lakes as a resource that is important to the well 
being of all the states. The main impetus for this agreement was the 
realization that water, as a scarce resource was very valuable and that 
there was considerable interest in the idea of exporting Great Lakes 
water out of the region. 
In 1986 the governors signed the Toxic Substances Control 
Agreement. While the Great Lakes Charter is concerned with preserving 
the quantity of the water, the Toxic Substances Agreement deals with 
the quality of the water. In 1988 the Premiers of Ontario and Quebec 
joined the governors by signing a Memorandum of Understanding to 
the Toxic Substances Control Agreement (Council of Great Lakes 
Governors, Summary, 1989). 
To implement the goals specified by the Toxic Substance 
Agreement, and the international agreements signed by the United 
States and Canada, the Great Lakes Protection Fund was established in 
1989. The purpose of the fund is to provide a permanent funding 
source for research on the effects of toxics, contamination clean-up, and 
community education about toxic substances in the Great Lakes Basin, 
both regionally and on the State level (N.Y. DEC, February 1990, p. 2). 
The participating states established a $100 million regional endowment 
fund to launch a comprehensive plan that would accomplish the goals 
and objectives as outlined in the above mentioned agreements. The 
level of contribution is based on the water consumption and usage of 
each state. An estimated $10 million is expected to be generated on an 
annual basis from the investment interest (Council of Great Lakes 
Governors, An Investment in Our Region's Future). Two-thirds of the 
money is targeted for regional use and one-third will be returned to 
the States for their use. 
Although all affected States have agreed by 1990 to contribute to 
the fund (The State of New York was the last to join the agreement), the 
funds have not been allocated in many States and may not be released 
due to the fiscal crisis that many States are facing. The State of New 
York, for example, plans to raise money for the fund by imposing a 
surcharge for large water withdrawers within the Great Lakes Basin. 
This proposal is controversial and may not be passed by the legislature 
in that State. As of May 1990, a total of 39.4 million dollars were 
already contributed to the fund, leaving 60.6 million to be raised. 
In response to the Exxon oil spill in Alaska's Prince William 
Sound, the governors, realizing that the Great Lakes were subject to 
such a disaster, signed the Great Lakes Oil Control Strategy Agreement. 
Under this agreement the governors plan to work with the Coast Guard 
and other appropriate agencies to identify sources of spills and to join 
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efforts to combat oil spills should they occur. In addition, the governors 
agreed to develop a basin wide capability to handle such a spill. 
As with the international agreements, the inter-state agreement 
followed the same path of evolution in the policy from water 
management to water quality improvement. The states and provinces 
have primary responsibility for fulfilling the obligations stipulated in 
the international and inter-state agreements. The degree of concern 
and the level of response varies among the States and Provinces. The 
State environmental agencies and other appropriate State agencies 
have primary responsibility for implementation. They work in 
conjunction with the local governments that are affected by the 
particular policy measure, for example within the Remedial Action Plan. 
To our knowledge, no formal agreements within any of the States 
regarding obligations under the Water Quality Agreements have been 
signed. 
4 THE ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE 
4.1 Overview 
Given the decentralized nature for implementation of the Great 
Lakes Water Quality Agreement, and the diversity of aims and goals 
that the impacted actors have, it is not surprising to find many levels of 
jurisdiction and activity. There are numerous organizations and 
committees addressing various problems regarding the Great Lakes 
water quality. The Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement is a 
centralized agreement between Canada and the United States, but the 
implementation is decentralized thus allowing for a broad range of 
actors and programs. These include international cooperative 
organizations, national and state/provincial agencies, educational, 
scientific and citizen participation organizations. A sampling of the 
types of institutions that have evolved in response to the degradation 
of the water quality of the Great Lakes provides some useful insights 
into the evolution of issues as well as the institutional and spontaneous 
responses to external events and political topics. 
4.2 International Structures 
International structures have developed in direct response to the 
Water Quality Agreements, such as the International loint Commission, 
as well as between governmental agencies with no legislative mandate. 
The International Joint Commission (UC) has the longest history of any 
organization concerned with the quantity and quality of the Great 
Lakes Water. The Commission is mandated by both the United States 
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and Canada and has evolved as the primary oversight and coordinating 
body in the Great Lakes Region. 
The IJC consists of three Canadian and three United States 
commissioners. The Canadian members are appointed by the 
Primeminister in consultation with the Governors' Council of Canada 
and the United States members are appointed by the U.S. President 
with the advice and consent of the U.S. Senate. The Commissioners do 
not serve as national representatives of their countries. Instead they 
are supposed to act as a nonpartisan unitary body seeking solutions 
that are in the best interest of both countries (IJC Activities, 1988). 
Being appointed by the highest executive bodies in each country they 
usually possess enough political influence and prestige to move beyond 
their pre-defined task if they choose to exercise that influence. At the 
same time, however, they reflect the environmental policy of the 
current administration and have alliances to their political cliental in 
Washington or Ottawa. During our interviews with representatives of 
citizen groups and scientists, the political character of the appointment, 
in particular the selection of political allies who need to be rewarded 
for their support by giving them a prestigious, but not very powerful 
position, was often perceived as an obstacle to efficient and consistent 
policy making. In the past, this criticism was specifically raised with 
regard to some of the Reagan appointees. 
In spite of this occasional criticism of the IJC, all observers agree 
that the high level appointment and the broad mandate of the 
Commission have helped to facilitate international agreement and to 
launch successful remediation programs. The IJC has the formal 
authority to make binding decisions in the event that both 
governments refer an issue to them for that purpose. This provision, 
however, has not yet been used (IJC, Activities 1988). The functions of 
the IJC have remained in the realm of making reports and 
recommendations and acting to consolidate information and assess how 
the respective countries are furthering compliance with the Great Lakes 
Water Quality Agreement. The IJC continues to fulfill its mandate in 
water management, including addressing issues of water diversions and 
fluctuations in water levels. In addition, as issues of water quality have 
moved into the forefront of concern, the IJC has also played an 
important role in the development of new environmental policies and 
novel approaches to environmental management. As the dominant 
issue of concern has moved from pollution to toxics and now to the 
basin wide ecosystem approach. so to has the focus of the IJC. 
Under the 1978 Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement the IJC is 
required to make a full report to the Governments of the United States 
and Canada and to the State and Provincial governments on the 
progress towards the achievement of the objectives in the Agreement. 
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This report is supposed to be filed on a biennial basis. The first report 
was filed in 1981 and the IJC has been consistent in filing biennial 
reports since then. In contrast. it was not until the 1987 amendment 
that the countries were required to report to the IJC on their activities 
towards compliance with the goals set forth in the Agreements. In 
1988. both governments complied with this stipulation. filing the first 
of a series of reports that should help the IJC assess the activities of the 
respective governments. The report from the United States was 
prepared by the Environmental Protection Agency's Great Lakes 
National Program Office (this office is explained later). The Canadian 
report was prepared jointly by the Governments of Canada and Ontario. 
The difference in the parties responsible for each country's report 
is reflective of the different implementation policies of the two 
governments. Whereas the United States sets environmental policies 
through the various legislatures. but relies on its federal environmental 
protection agency with its local branches to implement environmental 
policies and to monitor the Great Lakes. the Canadian government 
perceives the challenge posed by the situation of the Great Lakes as so 
grave that Federal and Provincial governments join forces to initiate 
programs and to control implementation of their own programs as well 
as the IJC recommendations. The integration of policy making. fund 
granting. and enforcing functions on the governmental level has helped 
Canada to develop a consistent program for research. monitoring. clean-
uP. and enforcement of regulations. The United States. on the other 
hand. is more fragmented. Although new issues and ideas are more 
often generated on the U.S. than on the Canadian side. the integration of 
the various policy steps from research to successful implementation of 
laws and clean-ups is often lagging behind or even absent. A report 
recently released by the U.S. General Accounting Office criticized the 
United States responsiveness. citing the fact that the U.S. has failed to 
respond to a third of the IJC's recommendations (The Great Lakes 
United. Fall 1989). The need for both countries to report to the IJC has 
caused them to devote more effort to streamline their environmental 
policies and to follow up on the success or failure of previous policies. 
The country reports. have thus enhanced accountability and 
communication. 
Two additional Boards have been set up by the IJC under 
mandate from the 1972 and 1978 agreements. These are the Great 
Lakes Water Quality Board and the Science Advisory Board. The Water 
Quality Board is the principle advisor to the IJC on issues related to 
compliance with the Water Quality Agreements. The members of the 
Water Quality Board represent the State and Federal Agencies or 
Departments responsible for environmental policy making and/or 
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policy enforcement. The purpose of the board is to convert ]JC 
recommendations into practical guidelines for the various agencies and 
to monitor the success or failure of the various programs. The Water 
Quality Board has been more cautious and conservative in its policy 
formulations than the Commission itself or the Scientific Advisory 
Board, probably reflecting the administrative preference for continuity 
of established programs and the need for consensual agreements 
between the various, often antagonistic stakeholder groups. 
Since 1972 the Water Quality Board has filed biennial reports 
with the IJC in order to document the progress that has been made 
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towards the goals in the Water Quality Agreements. There are 
numerous sub-committees that assist the Board (See Figure 2). The 
Water Quality Board is responsible for reviewing the Remedial Action 
Plans that are submitted to the IJC for approval. The Board also 
sponsors workshops on various issues to assist it in preparing the 
reports to the IJC. Some of the recent workshops include (UC. Activities. 
1988): 
o Chemical Loading Workshop. Toronto 1987 
o Pesticide Mapping Workshop. Windsor 1988 
o Specimen Banking Roundtable. Detroit. 1988 
o Tributary Monitoring Workshop. Toledo 1988 
These workshops can also serve as a vehicle for input and advice 
from experts in the field. Through these workshops. new scientific 
evidence is incorporated into the deliberations of the Water Quality 
Board and special interest groups have the opportunity to raise their 
concerns. 
The Science Advisory Board was established in 1978 in order to 
assist the IJC and the Water Quality Board in fulfilling their duties. At 
present. the board consists of eighteen scientists. representing both 
Canada and the United States. The Science Advisory Board is a self-
recruiting body. After its initial establishment with well-known 
scientists. new members are added by group appointment. Recently the 
group added new members representing the fields of eco-toxicology 
and ecology. Although the IJC has the formal right to approve or 
disapprove new members. all nominated scientists are almost 
automatically approved. This appointment process ensures that only 
scientific qualification and not political considerations govern the 
composition of the Board. 
The meetings of the Scientific Advisory Board focus on the 
interaction between the Board members. invited experts in the field. 
other scientists and interested citizens. Some of the topics addressed by 
the Science Advisory Board include: Health. spills. biotechnology. 
ecosystem objectives. public participation and Remedial Action Plans, 
education, toxics management. and global climate change. (Sub-
committees are shown in Figure 2) 
One of the ynique features of the Great Lakes Water Quality 
Agreement and the 1987 Protocol Amendment is the obligation to 
integrate all levels of interest in the policy formulation process. Citizen 
participation is specifically indicated as an integral part of the Remedial 
Action Plans (RAP) and the Lakewide Management Plans. Both will be 
discussed later. 
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The Joint Commission has no funds to implement the policies that 
they suggest or even mandate. The budget only covers their own policy 
making process and the work of their staff members. The Commission 
can request that the Federal or State agencies responsible for 
environmental protection in both countries implement the 
recommended policies, but they have no immediate monetary or 
political power to enforce them. This gap between the power to set 
goals and the lack of funds to implement these goals has been a major 
cause of frustration and disappointment for many stakeholder groups 
in the area. 
As a central oversight body, the IJC, along with the Water Quality 
Board and the Science Advisory Board, has played a pivotal role in 
information distribution, education, and monitoring the activities of 
both Canada and the United States. In spite of its limited political 
authority, the Committee has been successful in launching new 
cooperative agreements between the U.S. and Canada and in setting the 
stage for more cooperation among the U.S. States. The Committee and 
its Boards are also active participants in the evolution of topics and 
perspectives with regard to the environmental quality that the 
residents in both countries demanded. 
In addition to the Joint Commission, other bi-national 
organizations have been established to improve the water quality in a 
more indirect way. For example, the Great Lakes Fishing Commission 
oversees all the fishing activities in the Lakes and establishes rules and 
policies for fishing and habitat preservation. The Commission has a 
subcommittee for each Lake where federal agencies and the bordering 
States' and Provincial agencies are represented. 
4.3 Federal to State/Province Structure 
4.3.1 Overview 
The nature of the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreements is one of 
centralized goals with decentralized implementation. The agreements 
set goals and priorities, delineate effluent limits and set timetables for 
compliance, but they do not tell the countries how to achieve these 
goals. Compliance methodology has been left up to the individual 
countries. Canada and the United States have taken very different 
strategies to implement these goals. In both cases the Federal 
governments have placed the primary responsibility for compliance 
with the State, Provincial and local governments. 
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4.3.2 The United States 
In the United States, the Federal government, after having signed 
the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreements, left implementation 
primarily up to the States and local governments. As a result of the 
1972 agreement, many municipalities received aid from the Federal 
government in order to construct, upgrade, and maintain wastewater 
treatment facilities. The States have been left with primary 
responsibility for developing the Remedial Action Plans (RAPS) for 
Areas of Concern. This is generally done through the state 
environmental protection agency in conjunction with the local 
government and concerned citizens. Since the budgets of these agencies 
are not increased to handle the increased responsibility a situation has 
developed in which the States do not have adequate resources to 
develop the RAPs and implement the Water Quality Agreements as 
rapidly as many would like (Kent Fuller, personal communication). 
While there have been no funds allocated for the states to fulfill 
their obligations under the Water Quality Agreements, many of the 
issues of concern fall within the jurisdiction of other Federal agencies 
and programs; such as the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, the 
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, the Fish and Wildlife Service, the U.S. 
Department of Agriculture, and the U.S. Geological Survey (EPA, 1988). 
Since the areas around the Lakes belong to three different regional 
districts of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, EPA decided to 
establish a coordinating center for environmental activities for the 
Great Lakes. This center, called "The Great Lakes National Program 
Office (GLNPO)", was created in 1978 to oversee the United States' 
obligations under the Water Quality Agreement. The Clean Water Act of 
1987 established formal statutory mandate for the GLNPO. The primary 
function of the GLNPO is one of coordination between the various 
government agencies that are involved and private organizations. 
GLNPO pursues four major goals (EPA GLNPO, 1988) p. 3): 
1. Coordination of all Federal and State activities regarding the 
Water Quality Agreements and the respective environmental 
laws. 
2. Surveillance and monitoring of the environmental quality of the 
Great Lakes. 
3. Organization of remedial demonstration projects. 
4. Coordination and initiating of funher research. 
The EPA's Great Lakes National Program Office (GLNPO) has been 
particularly instrumental in coordinating the activities of various 
agencies, both Federal and State, and in assisting the State and local 
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governments in the development of the RAPs. They also serve as a 
forum for scientists, regulators, and citizen groups to express and 
discuss their views. 
The activities of EPA and other Federal agencies (Corps of 
Engineers, National Oceanic and Aquatic Administration, Soil 
Conservation Agency and Fish and Wildlife Agency) are based on a 
series of environmental laws and statutes. Among them are: 
1. The National Pollution Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) 
2. The Clean Air Act (Point Source Reduction) 
3. The Toxic Substance Control Act 
4. The Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act 
5. The Safe Drinking Water Act 
6. The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act 
7. The National Conservation and Recovery Act 
8. The Corporate Liability Act 
All these statutes provide EPA with the legal framework to 
regulate point sources and to control ambient water and air quality. 
While the first efforts to reduce the levels of effluent discharges into 
the Lakes has been fairly effective, in particular the clean-up of 
municipal and industrial discharges, it has proven more difficult to 
reduce the levels of pollutants from non-point sources, such as 
agricultural practices and air pollutants absorbed by the surface water. 
The activities of the eight States bordering on the Great Lakes 
have been focused on the The Great Lakes Protection Fund, initiated by 
the Council of Great Lakes Governors in February 1989. It is the first 
cooperative funding program in the United States specifically for the 
purpose of fulfilling the countries obligations under the Water Quality 
Agreement. EPA's Great Lakes National Program Office (GLNPO) and the 
Council of Great Lakes Governors entered into an agreement by which 
the GLNPO will help the Council implement the Great Lakes Toxic 
Substances Control Agreement. 
In addition to these organizational efforts focused on 
environmental quality, other institutions play an important role for 
coordinating environmental policies for the U.S. The Great Lakes 
Commission, located in Michigan, is primarily concerned with economic 
development and coordination of the eight border States. The 
Commissioners, usually high officials from each state, are supposed to 
settle disputes between the States through negotiation as a means to 
avoid litigation. In recent years, environmental issues have become 
more prominent in the deliberations and play a major role in 
negotiations for future development plans. 
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4.3.3 Canada 
Coordination of Canada's implementation activities is less 
complicated than that of the United States since Ontario is the only 
Province that borders the Great Lakes. In addition. the government of 
Canada has committed itself to participating. coordinating and funding 
the Canadian obligations towards the implementation of the Great 
Lakes Water Quality Agreements. The Canada-Ontario Agreement on 
the Great Lakes Water Quality (COA) has been central to the 
Federal/provincial cooperation regarding implementation of the Water 
Quality Agreement. Under this agreement. the Canadian government. 
not only helps to fund the activities of the province of Ontario towards 
compliance with international obligations. but it also maintains an 
active role in policy formation. 
The COA Board of Review guides the implementation of the 
Canada-Ontario Agreement. The Federal representatives on this board 
include persons from Environment Canada. Fisheries & Oceans Canada, 
and Agriculture Canada. The provincial representatives include the 
Ministry of the Environment, the Ministry of Natural Resources and the 
Ministry of Agriculture and Food (Canada-Ontario Annual Report 1988, 
p. 4). In addition to the joint commitments towards meeting 
international obligations through the Canada-Ontario Agreement, both 
the Federal and the provincial governments have embarked on 
programs that should also further the goal of compliance. 
As with the United States. there are numerous Federal agencies 
whose juriSdiction falls within the realm of the Great Lakes. For 
example, Environment Canada, Agriculture Canada, Fisheries and 
Oceans Canada, Health and Welfare Canada, and Transport Canada 
(Christine Hogan, personal communication). In addition. under the 1989 
Great Lakes Action Plan the Federal government has committed 
spending $125 million towards implementing the new provisions of the 
1987 protocol; $50 million is for the Preservation program, $20 million 
is for the Health Effects program, and $55 million goes towards the 
Clean-up fund which includes development of the RAPs (Environment 
Canada, Great Lakes Action Plan). 
One example of a provincial program is the Municipal Industrial 
Strategy for Abatement (MISA). This is a major initiative by Ontario to 
reduce water pollution from industrial and municipal dischargers. It 
includes monitoring discharges and assessing fines if permissible 
effluent levels are exceeded (Environment Ontario, Background 
Information on MISA 
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4.4 Non-governmental Organizations 
In addition to all the State and Federal agencies, the international 
commISSIons, the inter-state organizations, and the intra-state 
committees, there are many private organizations and groups which act 
as public interest groups, research coordinators. or policy facilitators in 
the Great Lakes Arena. Because of the vast number of actors in the 
arena, three organizations were selected for inclusion in this sub-
chapter. These three organizations can serve as examples of the three 
major types of non-governmental actors: researchers, policy brokers, 
and citizen groups. 
The Center for the Great Lakes with branches in Chicago and 
Toronto is one of the major research organizations in the area. Not 
affiliated with any stakeholder groups or public university, the Center 
has gained a reputation for unbiased reports and thorough analysis of 
problems. Most of its funding comes from private foundations, both 
from the United States and Canada. The Center also accepts special 
grants from various political constituencies in order to work on 
commissioned reports or studies. 
The topics of the Center's research include issues of economic 
development, consequences of industrial activities, impacts of 
waterway transportation, and environmental consequences. Some of 
our interview partners complained that the Center has often taken a 
rather conservative approach to policy questions by recommending soft 
actions or low cost remedies. This criticism was not echoed by the 
governmental actors who often rely on the Center for advice. 
One of the broker organizations is the Great Lakes Program. This 
program is a joint effort of the State of New York and the State 
University of New York in Buffalo. Although the program is anchored in 
New York, its activities reach out- to the whole region. The task of the 
program is to serve as a translator between scientists, regulators, and 
the public. The program directors organize conferences. workshops, and 
public meetings and prepare documents for regulators and the public. 
They inform the political representatives of both countries about the 
issues and try to convey the scientific paradigms underlying each new 
phase of research. For spring 1991, they plan to organize televised 
public hearings at the sites of remedial actions plans. During these 
hearings experts, regulators, and the representatives of each 
community can interact live in front of TV cameras and express their 
opinions, preferences, and frustrations. 
The most important public interest group is Great Lakes United. 
This citizen organization was founded in 1982 in order to strengthen 
the role of citizens in the formation and implementation of policies 
regarding the Great Lakes. It includes both, individual members as well 
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as organizations within the Great Lakes basin. The individual 
membership currently totals 800 members and there are over 180 
member organizations (Great Lakes United 1989). Through the number 
and diversity of the member organizations, Great Lakes United has 
gained a strong political influence in the Great Lakes arena. 
Membership organizations include environmental and conservation 
organizations, the United Auto Workers (Union), public libraries, state 
legislatures, fishing and hunting interests, and public health interests. 
Citizens from all eight U.S. States and the Province of Ontario are 
represented in this umbrella organization in addition to supporters 
from other regions. 
Great Lakes United is governed by 25 board members who are 
elected by the organizational members. Individual members have no 
voting rights. The board is responsible for formulating policies and 
advocating improvement of the environmental quality of the Lakes. 
The Board is supported by a staff of eight people who try to implement 
the policies adopted by the Board, to influence the political decision 
making process, and to inform the public about the organization's 
perspective on the relevant issues. The diversity of groups represented 
within the organization makes it necessary that all policies focus on 
common and consensual issues, that all political statements are 
discussed with potentially affected member organizations prior to 
making them public, and that all positions of Great Lakes United are not 
binding for individual member organizations. 
Great Lakes United has been instrumental in keeping citizens 
informed on the current issues and problems and encouraging citizens 
to keep pressure on their representatives. In 1986, the Great Lakes 
United Water Quality Task Force was formed. Disappointed with the 
mechanisms for public input provided by the IJC and the Federal 
governments, the task force organized nineteen hearings around the 
Lakes. These hearings addressed the research results regarding the 
water quality of the Lakes and provided a public forum for citizen 
input and concerns (Great Lakes United 1987). Pressure from Great 
Lakes United, under mandate from the citizens that attended these 
hearings, was instrumental in the outcome of the 1987 protocol 
amendment of the IJC. Under this amendment, the procedures for 
developing Remedial Action Plans were addressed. Annex 2, Section 3 
of the 1987 Amendment Protocol stipulates that "the parties, in 
cooperation with State and Provincial governments, shall ensure that 
the public is consulted in all actions undertaken pursuant to this 
Annex". This citizen participation has evolved as an institutional aspect 
of the water quality policy mainly through the activities of Great Lakes 
United. Citizen Advisory Committees are now required as a part of each 
Remedial Action Plan. 
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The activity of Great Lakes United to push a plan to clean up 
contaminated sediments was less successful. In spite of major efforts to 
mobilize public support and to involve researchers in pressing for a 
clean-up, political actions have not been taken and do not appear to be 
in sight. This lack of initiative from the legislature and the agencies can 
partially be attributed to the controversy within the science community 
on the risks and benefits of sedimentary clean-ups, Many scientist have 
expressed doubts that a clean-up would actually improve water quality 
since the disturbance of the sediments may lead to more toxic 
concentration in the water than without the clean-up. 
5. ENVIRONMENTAL CLEAN·UP PROGRAMS 
5.1 Remedial Action Plans 
The formulation of Remedial Action Plans (RAPs) are required in 
the 1987 protocol as a means of dealing with so called Areas of 
Concern. The Areas of Concern are regions within the Great Lakes that 
are out of compliance with the bi-national standards. There are a total 
of 42 RAPs in progress at this time. Twelve are on the Canadian side, 25 
are on the American side and five are being developed jointly. Many of 
these areas had been identified as "Hot Spots" as early as 1973, but not 
until tbe IIC took the initiative in 1985 and obliged the States to 
complete a list of areas of concern were the RAPs firmly established 
and mandated. Some of our interview partners criticized the selection 
of the 42 regions as being inconsistent and incomplete. Some highly 
contaminated areas were allegedly not included while some areas with 
marginal excess values above the standards had been selected for the 
list. All participants, however. welcomed the initiative of the loint 
Commission and promised to cooperate in accordance with their role 
assignment. 
The RAPs might best be characterized as a vertical decision 
making process. They are mandated in the international agreements, 
reviewed by the IIC, written by the State and local governments with 
help from the Federal governments and augmented by input from 
citizen groups, business, and industry. The need to involve citizens in 
formulating the RAPs is specifically mentioned in the 1987 protocol. 
The focus of the citizen participation is the Public Advisory Committee, 
composed of interested citizens. The citizen group Great Lakes United 
was instrumental in institutionalizing the role of citizen participation 
into the RAPs and has continued to remain active in the formation of 
the RAPs. 
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The RAPs are developed in a three stage process and are 
submitted to the IJC and the Great Lakes Water Quality Board for 
review after each stage. The stages are: 
1. Problem definition, description of environmental conditions and 
identification of sources. 
2. Identification of options, selection and implementation of 
preferred options. 
3. Monitoring and surveillance to evaluate effectiveness. 
The Water Quality Board is responsible for monitoring and 
evaluating the process and overall effectiveness of the individual RAPs. 
The RAPs are the epitome of combining centralized goals with 
decentralized implementation. The IJC oversees the RAPs to ensure that 
they accomplish the goal that they were established for, but they are 
written on a localized basis. This local participation allows for the 
municipalities, industry, and citizens to participate in the planning. This 
involvement in the process should help to ease the potential obstacles 
for implementation and achieve compliance of the actors since they 
were part of the policy making process. In this way they will agree 
with the objectives of the plan and have a stake in the successful 
outcome. At the same time, the success of a particular RAP is highly 
dependent on the participation and cooperative skills of the persons 
involved 
In several interviews with people involved in the RAPs, concerns 
were raised that the mandated mixture of citizens, industry, municipal 
officials, and others paralyzed the process more than that it facilitated a 
compromise. The goals and objectives were hardly disputed. but when 
it came to concrete requirements putting burdens on municipalities or 
industries, it was difficult to find a common denominator and to set 
policies that were able to actually reach the commonly agreed goals. 
Furthermore, citizen organizations often felt frustrated that they were 
forced' to compromise with industry and municipalities without having 
the right to state their position independently. The outcomes of the 
participation meetings were interpreted by the Water Quality Board as 
the "voice" of the people, but the citizens involved in the RAPs 
perceived the recommendations of the Advisory Board as compromises 
between antagonistic interest groups and not as their preferred point of 
view. 
The structure of the RAPs, with the high level of governmental 
and citizen involvement, has been a learning process for all who have 
taken part in the process. The Great Lakes Water Quality Board has 
made the following observations regarding the process (1989 Report on 
Great Lakes Water Quality, Executive summary): 
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1. Successes: 
o Enhanced Communication and institutional cooperation. 
o Greater Public Awareness. 
o More emphasis on control of contaminants at the source. 
o Greater emphasis on remediation of contaminated sediments. 
o More financial and human resources being focused on Areas of 
Concern. 
2. Challenges: 
o Identifying responsibilities for remediation and increasing 
accountability. 
o Developing political and business support. 
o Moving forward with remediation, despite "imperfect" data 
bases. 
o Developing long-term funding mechanisms while sustaining 
public support. 
3. Observations: 
o It is taking longer than expected to develop RAPs. 
o Public expectations are high. 
o Available resources are limited. 
o The evolution of RAPs towards integrated resource management 
is consistent with the ecosystem approach of the Agreement. 
The evaluation of the Water Quality Board has been echoed by 
many stakeholder groups. Barry Boyer, professor of law at the State 
University of New York in Buffalo, who was involved in several RAPs 
in New York, concluded in our interview that the success or failure of 
each RAP was more determined by idiosyncrasies of the special 
situation than by any systematic properties of the process. The more an 
area was already in a transitional stage of its economic development, 
the more --so his impression-- were all stakeholders motivated to find 
a common solution and to initiate novel approaches to clean-ups. 
The crucial point was the linkage between economic development 
and environmental quality. If environmental protection was seen as an 
integrative part of the future economic development, the RAP process 
was easier to implement and people felt more motivated to participate. 
In areas of economic stagnation or with a predominance of establisited 
manufacturing industries the process dragged on and the motivation 
for participation was low, even among the affected population. In 
accordance with the theories of relative deprivation, the low 
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mobilization rate in already deteriorating areas does not come 
unexpected. As Boyer pointed out, however, these findings are not 
consistent for all areas of concern. Some economically deprived areas 
developed excellent RAPs while other boom regions did very poorly. 
The executive director of Great Lakes United, the umbrella 
organization for more than 180 citizen groups, Phillip Weller, perceived 
the success of the RAPs as being dependent on five factors: 
1. The ability of the RAP organizers to create a vision of the future 
of the area including economic development, urban or rural 
identity, and environmental quality. 
2. The political support of and symbolic gratifications by the 
municipal government and other political bodies for the 
participants of the RAPs. The members of the RAPs Committees 
would need constant reinforcement and some gratifications along 
the road. 
3. The potential for a wide representation of interest groups and 
citizens in the RAP committees and a community wide recognition 
of their importance. 
4. The ability to provide scientific knowledge to the members of the 
Committee and at the same time to enhance their confidence in 
their own ability to digest all the information and to form 
prudent judgments. 
5. The willingness of the participants to integrate different values 
and cultural perspectives into the RAPs and to incorporate the 
ecosystems approach as the basis for designing the Remedial 
Action Plans. 
In other interviews with scientists or representatives of citIzen 
groups the lack of immediate follow-up for implementing the 
recommendations of the RAPs was also seen as a critical issue, at least 
in the United States. So far no funds have been dedicated to finance the 
implementation of the RAPs in the United States. The participants of 
the process wer~ left "in the dark" about the extent and timing of State 
or Federal money allocated for this purpose. As long as the RAPs 
include voluntary commitments by the participants, this issue is not 
important. When the clean-up stage begins, funding is a crucial part of 
the plan. 
The ·Toxic Substances Control Act, which serves to restrict the 
distrib~tion of critical pollutants, has been of major importance for the 
imple'tnentation of the U.S. RAPs. Through its provisions, point source 
polluters can be forced to reduce their emissions. Also, federal funds 
for clean-ups can be appropriated through this Act. In addition, some of 
the Areas of Concern receive money under the Resource Conservation 
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and Recovery Act for clean-up of areas that fall under the jurisdiction 
of the Superfund. In addition to funds from each State, The Council of 
Great Lakes Governors, having signed the Great Lakes Toxic Substances 
Control Agreement, designated portions of the Great Lakes Protection 
Fund for regional projects. Since this fund is still in its infancy, it is not 
quite clear yet how much will be spent for the RAPs. Overall, the State 
and local governments have not received enough funding to adequately 
address the RAPs or other aspects of the Great Lakes Water Quality 
Agreements. 
The lack of funds and the uncertain future of the RAPs have been 
the most frequently voiced concern in our interviews. However, many 
observers of the situation expressed cautious optimism that the 
implementation process will be initiated once the RAPs are completed. 
The whole RAP procedure with its publicity and political clout has 
created so much legitimation pressure that ignoring its outcome would 
be equivalent to political suicide. In addition. many regions want to 
attract new businesses and population: these goals can be reached only 
if the environmental quality of the respective region is at least 
satisfactory. Being on a list for violating environmental standards 
creates negative images and appalls newcomers. Finally, corporations 
and other point source emitters are well aware that this might be their 
last opportunity to reach a voluntary agreement. In anticipation of 
tougher environmental standards and their enforcement, many 
industries perceive advantages in cooperating with the RAPs because 
this helps them to express their responsibility towards their host 
community and to increase their environmental reputation. 
The RAPs may therefore succeed in areas where remedial actions 
require ongoing commitments from all participants. More problematic, 
however, is the situation where funds are necessary to clean-up areas 
that are already polluted or contaminated, but nobody can be identified 
as legally responsible for the damage. If the parties involved in the 
RAPs can not locate funds for such a clean-up (for example. from the 
Superfunds program). the program cannot be implemented. 
On the Canadian side, the government of the Province of Ontario 
and the Federal government have already identified funds for 
implementing the RAPs, an equivalent commitment of the U.S. is still 
missing. If the transition from planning to implementation is 
interrupted or delayed for a long time. the likely consequence will be 
increased frustration on the side of the participants and a growing 
distrust in the environmental policy making bodies. 
3 I 
5.2 Lakewide Management Plans and Point Source Impact 
Zones 
As with the Remedial Action Plans, the Lakewide Management 
Plans (LMP) for Critical Pollutants are mandated under the 1987 
Amendment. The state, local, and federal governments associated with 
each lake are to identify, design, and implement plans for each lake in 
which they reduce the presence of critical pollutants. These plans are to 
take place in a four stage process with review and approval by the IJC 
following each step. Following are the designated steps: 
1) Identify critical pollutants, evaluate all existing information 
regarding concentrations, sources, and pathways. 
2) Determine the load reduction necessary to meet international 
obligations. 
3) Identify remedial actions necessary to accomplish the specified 
goal and the persons or agencies responsible for implementation. 
4) Monitor the activity and pollutant levels and report to the IJC 
when the specified level has been achieved. 
The LMPs are similar to the RAPs, including the requirement for 
citizen participation, but the goal is much more difficult to achieve 
because of the wider geographic scale and the fact that the lakes are 
subject to airborne pollutants that the bordering governments may not 
have control over. The 1989 Report on Great Lakes Water Quality 
prepared by the Great Lakes Water Quality Board, indicates that the 
process of designing LMPs cannot begin formal planning until the IJC 
receives a more precise definition of the meaning of the mandate. 
Point Source Impact Zones (PSIZ) are areas that are associated 
with direct discharge of industrial or municipal wastes that are 
significant. These are to be reported to the IJC along with plans for 
reductions in the discharge consistent with the policy of virtual 
elimination of persistent toxic substances. As with the LMPs, the liC is 
requesting a clearer mandate from the parties to the agreement. 
5.3 Niagara River Toxics Management Plan 
The Niagara River Toxics Management Plan is a cooperative effort 
between Environment Canada, the U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency, Ontario Ministry of the Environment and the New York State 
Department of Environmental Conservation. By signing the Declaration 
of Intent in 1987, these four jurisdictions committed to a cooperative 
management strategy and evaluation process in their efforts to reduce 
loadings of toxic chemicals to the Niagara River. Under this plan, the 
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four agencies have worked together to develop mutually agreed upon 
sampling and analytical protocols. The parties have targeted certain 
priority toxics and have committed to reducing the point and non-
source loadings of these chemicals by 50% by 1996. A workplan is 
revised annually to reflect new operating methods and activities. The 
goal in the long run is consistent with the 1987 protocol amendment of 
zero discharge of toxic chemicals into the Lakes (Environment Canada. 
EPA 1988). 
5.4 Lake Ontario Toxies Management Plan 
The same four parties represented in the the Niagara River Toxics 
Management Plan are also parties to the lake Ontario Toxics 
management Plan. The goals are also similar. the reduction and 
eventual elimination of toxic discharge into Lake Ontario. The Lake 
Ontario Toxics Committee has been formed to carry out the goals of the 
Plan. Implementation is a two step process. First. an aggressive public 
outreach effort has been carried out to ascertain the opinion of the 
public. The results of this effort are reported in the Public 
Responsiveness Document. The next step will be to develop a working 
plan to gather additional necessary information and develop a 
management framework for clean-up. The parties are encouraged to 
proceed to implementation as soon as possible (Lake Ontario Toxics 
Committee. 1989). 
In addition to the DC. the Federal. and State programs. there are 
other programs that operate on a cooperative basis among these three 
larger entities. Examples of such initiatives within the United States 
include the Green Bay Mass Balance project. and the Lake Michigan 
Toxic pollutant ControllReduction Strategy. Under both of these plans. 
EPA is working in conjunction with State agencies on Great Lakes 
projects. The Mass Balance Project is developing and testing a modeling 
framework to increase understanding of the sources. transport and fate 
of toxics. The Lake Michigan Project incorporates all States that border 
on Lake Michigan. All the states have committed to reductions in the 
loading of toxic pollutants. This plan hopes to make use of the Green 
Bay Mass Balance Project in the further development of reduction plans 
(EPA 1988). 
6. SPECIAL ISSUES OF COOPERATIVE PLANNING 
6.1 Structural Elements of the International Agreements 
There is a number of factors that influence the cooperative 
process and the level of commitment once the basic concepts of 
33 
cleaning up and protecting the environment have been agreed to. 
Following are some of the factors that have been identified: 
Specific Versus General Mandate: The nature of these 
agreements. centralized goals with decentralized implementation. has 
proven to be a pivotal basis in the cooperative process. The 
international agreements as well as the interstate agreements focused 
on building a common view of the Great Lakes and the environmental 
problems that are associated with them. Targets were set for specific 
reductions in emissions. but the agreements did not discuss how these 
goals should be met. The agreements specified what was to be done. not 
how to do it. In addition. both Canada and the United States further 
decentralized the process by leaving primary responsibility for 
implementation with the State and local governments. This can have 
both positive and negative implications. 
On the international level. it is much easier to come to such an 
agreement when there lUe fewer details. On an intra-state level this 
decentralization is beneficial in that the states and provinces are most 
familiar with the situations at hand and are aware of the political. 
economic. and social implications that might be associated with any 
specific policy option. This should mitigate resistance to implementation 
and enlist the local citizens as stakeholders both in the policy process 
and the outcome. On the other hand. because there are no specifications 
of what to do. there can be differing levels of commitment towards 
implementation. In this case we have a situation in which the goals are 
agreed on by the Federal governments. but the State and local 
governments must expend the resources for compliance. 
The government - of Canada. while leaving primary responsibility 
for implementation with Ontario, committed funding in order that 
Ontario could achieve the agreement that the Federal government had 
signed. In the United States. the Federal government has not targeted 
any funding for the States directly for compliance with the Water 
Quality Agreements. The States have been left to their own resources to 
fund the additional programs necessary for compliance. although there 
has been Federal involvement through the various agencies that have 
jurisdiction over specific issues. 
The Crucial Function of Adequate Funding: One of the potential 
downsides to the decentralized implementation is that. while the 
intentions are good. the funding necessary to carry out the agreements 
is not institutionalized and therefore may not be forthcoming. Funding 
is absolutely necessary to fulfill the obligations agreed to when the 
agreements were signed. Canada and the United States approached the 
problem of funding in two very different fashions. It appears that the 
method utilized by Canada is more effective. 
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Event Driven Actions: While some actions come about slowly in 
response to a growing awareness of some problem, others are driven 
by a specific event. The actual event does not have to be within the 
geographic region for which the policy is being discussed, but it is 
usually something that the citizens and politicians of the area can 
identify with. It is something that could possibly happen within their 
jurisdiction and the fact that the event happened elsewhere simply 
highlights their perception of vulnerability. For example, the Exxon oil 
spill in Alaska's Prince William Sound, caused the Council of Great 
Lakes Governors to realize that such a disaster could happen in the 
Great Lakes. They therefore signed the Great Lakes Oil Control Strategy 
Agreement (Council of Great Lakes Governors Summary 1989). 
These events can be neither predicted nor planned for, but when 
they do happen, if the proper institutional structures exist, they can 
become a catalyst for further cooperation. It is important to have an 
organizational structure in place that is flexible enough to respond to 
surprise events and that can initiate actions in the case of a sudden 
adverse effect. It may even be advantageous to have a subcommittee of 
one of the governing agencies or Commission deal specifically with 
crisis management. Such a subcommittee must be connected to local 
agencies or disaster relief organizations in order to be effective and 
responsive to public needs. 
6.2 The Role of Citizen Involvement and Special Interest 
Groups 
Citizens in the Great Lakes Basin have continued to have an 
important role in the policy regarding the Great Lakes. The increasing 
degradation of the Lakes and the eutrophication caused citizens to 
demand that something be done to protect the quality of the water. The 
1972 Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement was the international 
policy response. Since then citizens have been important in informal 
oversight functions. 
It is interesting to note that the traditional conflicts between 
industry on one hand and environmental groups on the other, have not 
been central to the policy making process. The common stereotype of 
industrialists pushing for profits rather than caring for the 
environment and of environmental groups neglecting economic 
viability in the pursuit of environmenal protection has to be replaced 
by a more complex structure of interests and public concerns. Many 
industries and economic enterprises, specifically the high-tech sector as 
well as the service sector, are actively promoting an environmental 
clean-up program and play an active part in some of the citizen 
advocacy groups. At the same time, some of the environmentally active 
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groups favor the promotion of economic development within the limits 
of sustainable growth. 
The Great Lakes can serve as an example of the novel formation 
of interest groups. On one side, traditional industries, developers, and 
part of the administrative system join forces to slow down the process 
of environmental policy making in the area. On the other hand, many 
new industries, the young entrepreneurs, scientists, and affected 
citizens have formed a coalition to speed up the process of 
environmental policy making. This process has been more pronounced 
in the United States where alliances to traditional coalitions and parties 
have never been very stable. In Canada, many of the established 
division lines between industry and environmentalists prevail. 
However, the consensual system there provides more incentives for 
these groups to initiate a dialogue whereas in the United States the 
adversarial nature of politics prevents the different interest groups 
from direct cooperation (Interview with P. Weller). 
All interview partners expressed some degree of appreciation for 
the input from the citizen groups even if they disagreed with the 
position that these groups had taken. The common complaint that 
citizens are uneducated, biased in their views, or mislead by a 
sensational press were not echoed by most of our interview partners. 
Although some felt that the health risks posed by organic toxics from 
the Great Lakes were exaggerated in the public, they nevertheless 
assigned the citizen groups a high degree of rationality and knowledge. 
It seems that the coalition of "Yuppis", scientists, entrepreneurs, 
sportsfisher, and other interest groups provides an internal incentive to 
search for scientific evidence and to balance different competing 
interests, before the positions are made pUblic. 
It is certainly impossible to transfer such a coalition to another 
country. The lesson to learn from this observation is, however, that 
policy makers in other countries should not deal exclusively with the 
established interest groups, but make an attempt to integrate a large 
variety of interest groups and even not (yet) organized citizens into the 
policy process. Such an effort may help to initiate a process of 
spontaneous organization and reformation of interests. It depends on 
the special dynamics of the situation and the cultural background 
whether a novel coalition is formed and which groups will join that 
coalition. It can only be in the interest of policy makers to provide 
incentives for the formation of an informed and politically active citizen 
representation. 
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6.3 The Role of Science 
Science has played an important role in the cooperative policy 
regarding the Great Lakes. As the dominant issue of concern has shifted 
from water management to water quality, the policy makers have 
become increasingly dependent on science to help identify areas of 
concern. The ability of science to detect trace amounts of chemicals was 
pivotal in the formation of the 1978 Water Quality Agreement in which 
the primary focus is on toxic pollutants. It was under mandate from 
this agreement that the Great Lakes Science Advisory Board was 
formed. This is an explicit acknowledgement of the important role of 
science in cooperative policy planning. In addition to sounding the 
alarm regarding the dangers and the degree of toxic chemicals found in 
the Great Lakes, science also plays an increasingly important role in 
recommending standards, monitoring the conditions in the lakes, and 
aiding in the modification of priorities and goals. 
In recent years, scientific groups were specifically active in 
promoting new paradigms of policy making and environmental 
regulation. The politization of scientific groups, however, has 
invigorated the debate on the role of science in the policy process. Since 
issues of risk and probabilities lend themselves to subjective 
interpretation and often lead to intra-scientific controversies, there is 
normally a wide range of legitimate conclusions from identical data 
sets. The inference from ·what is· to "what ought to be" adds an 
additional subjective component to the statements made by scientists. 
As a result, the more politically active scientists have been in the 
debate, the more they have given up the ·objectivity· of scientific 
evidence and entered the realm of advocacy. This transition has 
certainly benefited the citizen groups who --as stated above-- have 
absorbed many scientists into their midst. The loss of objectivity, 
however, weakens the ability of science to act as an integrative force in 
conflict resolution.(Coppock 1985). Many scientists in our interviews 
expressed concerns about the politization of science and its 
instrumentalization for rationalizing positions. 
Figure 3 is based on an interview with one of scientists, Dr. 
Warren Flint from the State University of New York in Buffalo. In his 
view, there are four legitimate areas of involvement for scientists: to do 
basic research, to engage in applied research, to work on an integrated 
bigger picture, and to promote a specific cause. The more scientists tend 
to move to the right side of the tasks, i.e. broaden their mission, the 
more they lose credibility on the left side, specifically in the area of 
basic research. Such a move is accompanied by a shift in the incentive 
system. Peer review is less important for an advocate; his or her 
reputation is based rather on social recognition and public awareness. 
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The deficit of this shift is that the most needed input by scientists for 
integrating policies, i.e. the construction of an unbiased bigger picture, 
is least rewarded within the science system and by advocacy groups. 
As a result, scientists tend to group themselves along the two poles of 
this spectrum: either to stay within the scientific community by doing 
basic and some applied research or to move to the other extreme and 
become a scientific advisor to a special interest group. If science is to 
serve as an integrating force, some incentives have to be provided for 
scientists to combine such a role with career ambitions and personal 
reputation. 
7 EVALUATION OF COOPERATION PROCESS 
7.1 Evolution of Underlying Principles of Policies 
The development of an environmental policy for the Great Lakes 
Basin that is acceptable to all parties involved has been an evolutionary 
process. It is a process that continues to evolve as new agenda items 
are identified and the goals of society change. For example, the 1989 
Fourth Biennial Report of the International Joint Commission is already 
anticipating changing issues, such as prevention instead of clean-up and 
the need to have an adaptive strategy to deal will uncertain futures 
(IIC 1989). 
The policy evolution for The Great Lakes Clean-up can be 
structured into five distinctive steps: 
1. Water Quantity Management: The first stage in cooperative 
policy making evolved out of concern for excessive water use and 
shipping problems. Questions of water quality did not surface and 
were seen as irrelevant given the vast quantity of water in the 
Lakes. 
2. Programs against eutrophication and visible impacts: Starting 
with the 1970s, the quality of the Lakes became a major political 
issue. The environmental movement, though not centered around 
the Great Lakes, stimulated public concern about the Great Lakes 
environment. This public concern was further fueled by visible 
pollution of the Lakes, particularly Lake Erie. Due to the 
unfiltered discharge of waste water, Lake Erie was over-saturated 
with nutrients which precipitated an excessive growth of algae. 
The visible deterioration of the Lakes in conjunction with 
economic losses of the fishing industry provided sufficient stimuli 
for the political actors to get involved in a massive clean-up 
program. Within ten years the Lakes were cleaned from 
phosphorus and municipalities and industries were forced to 
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build water treatment plants to reduce pollution. By 1989, more 
than 85 percent of all effluents were cleaned in a water 
treatment plant (EPA 1988). 
3. Point Source Reduction: The next stage in the clean-up effort 
included the typical industrial toxics, such as heavy metals and 
organic substances. By imposing point source emission limits and 
by setting ambient standards for toxics at the point of discharge, 
the overall burden to the Great Lakes was drastically reduced. 
The Joint Commission advocated zero discharge as their final goal, 
but the usual principles of ALARA (as low as reasonably 
achievable) and BACT (best available control technology) were 
applied to define practical limits of emission. 
4. Mass Balance Approach: The shortcoming of the point source 
reduction strategy is that it does not work toward an absolute 
reduction in the total amount of pollutants discharged into the 
entire system, but rather only addresses relative levels of 
reduction. Even if all polluters reduce their emissions, the 
absolute levels may increase due to the cumulative and persistent 
nature of toxic substances (Flint 1990). The Mass balance 
approach models the fate of each toxin through its entire life-
cycle and investigates the accumulation versus degradation rate. 
In accordance with this concept, the amount of discharges allowed 
to enter the system should be equal to the amount which is 
biodegraded or otherwise removed from the system. 
5. Ecosystem Management: The mass balance approach which is 
presently pursued by EPA and Environment Canada leads to a 
more comprehensive ecosystem management. This novel concept 
implies that the mass balance is not only kept constant, but is 
reduced to lower levels, if the ecosystem is already damaged by 
the amount previously discharged into the Lakes. In addition, the 
systems approach requires a more comprehensive environmental 
strategy, including land use management, the application of bio-
indicators as early warning system, and preservation of bio-
diversity. 
These five evolutionary steps build upon each other and illustrate 
the dynamic nature of environmental policies. The change in 
underlying principles or paradigms, most notable in the shift from an 
acceptable risk reduction principle to a cumulative mass balance 
approach, signals the change in values of the North American 
population, but is also an indicator of the scientific advancement in 
studying environmental problems. The mass balance approach is based 
on complex computer models and a better insight into the process of 
bio-accumulation and load allocation. 
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7.2 Escalation of Concerns and Policy Issues 
The cooperative strategy that the international agreements are 
based on reflects an evolutionary understanding of the problems and 
the corresponding remedial philosophies. This can be seen at all levels, 
both horizontally between nations and states, as well as vertically as 
with the Remedial Action Plans. The first international agreement, the 
Boundary Waters Treaty, was limited in scope and had a very narrow 
focus. The parties agreed to work together towards common 
management of the lake as a resource, but they were not required to 
implement any internal policy that might have impacted citizens 
through changed behaviors. As society's agenda shifted to reflect 
environmental concern, so to did the scope of the international 
agreements. The 1972 agreement, concerned primarily with the 
aesthetics of the water quality was able to build on the previous 
agreement. The goals were focused on reducing the nutrient loading of 
the lakes that was responsible for the eutrophication. The actions that 
the countries were required to take could be targeted easily, 
wastewater treatment and the reduction of phosphorous emissions into 
the lakes. 
The Water Quality Agreement of 1978 continued to build on the 
existing institutions while expanding the goals in order to accommodate 
the changing desires of society. The emphasis on both the clean-up of 
toxics in the water and the elimination of toxic emissions is a much 
more intractable problem and requires the resources and cooperation 
of numerous agencies. Finally, the 1987 protocol amendment 
reaffirmed the previous agreements, put in place some institutional 
processes to accomplish the goals and emphasized a growing awareness 
of the Great Lakes Basin ecosystem. This ecosystem approach is again 
an expansion of the scope of the international agreements. No longer is 
the issue only water quality. It has now been expanded to included all 
activities in the Basin that might affect the health of the ecosystem. It 
is unlikely that this is the last agreement and it should not be viewed 
as such. Rather as the scope of knowledge changes and the 
environmental awareness of society expands. there will be yet another 
agreement that will incorporate these changing perceptions. 
This escalation, both in the scope of the issues addressed and in 
the breadth of the policy can also be seen in other contexts. For 
example, the first agreement signed by the Great Lakes Governors 
Council, the Great Lakes Charter, was concerned primarily with 
managing the water as a resource. Specifically, the issue was water 
diversions. Building on this precedent in order to reflect the changing 
awareness of humans relationship to the Lakes, the Governors signed 
the Toxic Substances Control Agreement. Finally, to reaffirm the 
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previous commitments and strengthen implementation, the Great Lakes 
protection Fund Agreement was signed. 
It is clear that the precedent set by each agreement is valuable, 
both in setting the mechanisms for future agreements as well as for the 
perception of what can be accomplished within the specific context. Had 
Canada and the United States set out to formulate an all encompassing 
ecosystem approach from the start it is unlikely that they would have 
succeeded. Each success, or failure, provides a valuable base upon 
which to expand and build in the continual succession of shifting 
perceptions of humans relationship to the Great Lakes. 
7.3 Benefits and Problems of the Process 
As with any policy. there are both strengths and weaknesses in 
the Great Lakes clean-up program. Many of the strengths developed 
through a process of trial and error as policy has been developed, 
implemented. evaluated, and subsequently adjusted to further the 
desired goals. The problems have tended to be either incidentai to the 
policy process. issues that simply have not yet been addressed. or 
issues that remain too difficult to reach an agreement on. The 
dominant characteristics of the policy process as it has evolved have 
proven to be both beneficial and problematic, depending on the 
perspective of the evaluation. 
The centralized goals are beneficial in that all governmental 
stakeholders involved. federal, state. provincial. and local are working 
towards the same goals. There is a common vision of how the Great 
Lakes should be in the future and a common commitment to work 
towards this vision. By specifying goals and not mechanisms. an 
international agreement that is acceptable to all parties is more readily 
accessible and international cooperation is thereby easier to obtain. At 
the same time emphasis on goals and not mechanisms can lead to 
inequities in implementation. Each country has its own political process 
that can further or hinder the accomplishment of the goals. By not 
specifying mechanisms it is easier to come to an agreement. but at the 
same time, the implementation process is then subject to the internal 
political process and may; therefore. be delayed or watered down. 
Funding for implementation exemplifies these problems. Had 
funding been specified as a criteria for the agreements it is 
questionable whether such agreements could have been finalized. At 
the same time. now that the agreements are in force. it is clear that 
funding is one of the most problematic aspects of implementation. 
There has been insufficient funding for preparation of the Remedial 
Action Plans as well as implementation of all phases of the clean-up. 
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Another area that has proven to be problematic deals with the 
idea of studying the problem rather than correcting it. The Water 
Quality Agreements call for both research and implementation of 
corrective policy. Since research is finanCially, socially, and politically 
easier to initiate than implementation, the focus of most activity has 
been research. 
The decentralized implementation has also proven to be both 
beneficial as well as problematic. One of the major strengths of the 
Great Lakes clean-up program is the implementation at the local level. 
This allows for the incorporation of many stakeholders that might 
otherwise be excluded, thus making successful implementation more 
likely. There have also been problems with this system. For example, it 
is taking longer than expected to develop the RAPs. As a result, the 
actual clean-up is later than expected. This can be seen as a function of 
two aspects of the program. The first is the lack of sufficient funding 
which was discussed earlier. The second is simply that the more 
stakeholders that are involved the more difficult it is to reach an 
agreement. The fact that the RAPs are taking longer than expected may, 
in part, be viewed as a result of unrealistic expectations. Given that the 
concept of the RAPs is new, there was no other precedent to proceed by 
when determining the timing of the process. It appears that the 
difficulties of a consensual process were under-estimated. This might 
necessitate a shifting in perceptions of the RAPs, but in not way should 
be taken as condemnation. Given the fact that the RAPs are dependent 
on the local citizens and political processes, the outcomes can vary a lot 
depending on the persons involved. 
Another function of the decentralized implementation has been a 
fragmentation of responsibilities. In both Canada and the United States, 
there are numerous agencies involved in small parts of the program. 
Since the United States has many more governmental jurisdictions 
involved this fragmentation is more apparent in the U.S., but it can also 
been seen in Canada. For example the department of fisheries is 
responsible for the well being of the fish in the lakes, the department 
of forestry and agriculture is responsible for non-point run-off sources 
of contamination, and the department of atmosphere is responsible for 
airborne deposition. This has resulted because both in the United States 
and in Canada, implementation has, for the most part, been effectuated 
through existing institutions. 
One of the problems with this fragmented implementation is a 
redundancy of effort. The numerous layers and levels of jurisdiction 
have lead to a situation where, if jurisdiction is not clearly defined, two 
or more parties may address the same problem. Limited resources 
could be better utilized with strengthened systems of institutional 
information sharing. Sharing information may lead to a consensual 
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process of sharing responsibilities rather than competing for the same 
administrati ve task. 
There are two areas of the program that appear to have been 
beneficial to the whole process. These might be viewed as an 
underlying philosophy regarding the Great Lakes programs. The first is 
the integration of scientific advice, administrative routines, political 
processes, and citizen preferences. It is thought that this is one of the 
key ingredients of the program and a transfer of this concept can 
clearly help similar programs. In addition, the institutions and persons 
involved have been sensitive to changing needs of society and have 
been able to respond as new environmental paradigms evolve from 
pollution control and aesthetics, to invisible toxics and now to the basin 
wide ecosystem approach. This ability to reflect the current social 
environmental ethics, and often to be at the forefront of these changes, 
has made it possible to build on existing institutions and experience 
and to meet the challenges posed by scientific discoveries and their 
interpretation by diverse interest groups. 
7.4 Policy Evaluation 
The policy process, both on the international and inter-state level, 
has received mixed reviews from the participants and outside 
observers. While some analysts claim that the outcome of the various 
programs has been worth the effort and even praise the Great Lakes as 
a model area for effective policy making, others have criticized the 
fragmentation of the policy process, the over-emphasis on research 
rather than clean-up, and the confusing mix of authorities and 
responsibilities. These critical remarks have been addressed more to 
the United States than to Canada. The Canadian approach, however, has 
also been the target for critical remarks. Some observers feel that the 
Canadians do not exercise enough initiative, other have complained 
about a lack of citizen participation and a preference of Canadian 
politicians to use the Great Lake clean-up program as a political vehicle 
for gaining public support without ascribing to its underlying 
principles. 
Looking into the accomplishments so far, the policies were rather 
successful in reducing overall levels of heavy metals, many nutrients, 
and other pollutants. At the same time, however, toxic organic 
substances and nitrate concentrations are still on the rise and many 
sediments of the Lakes are loaded with them. Overall water quality has 
clearly improved, but bio-accumulation of toxic substances in fish and 
other species has increased. These mixed results cannot be attributed to 
the Great Lakes policies alone. Many organic substances enter the Lakes 
through absorption of air pollutants into the surface water. These 
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pollutants originate in other States or Provinces and are therefore 
outside of the jurisdiction of the constituencies involved. The nitrates in 
the Lakes are mostly due to fertilizers from agricultural land. As long 
as nitrogen containing fertilizers are almost unregulated, there is little 
chance of reducing the amount of runoff. 
The success of environmental policies cannot be measured in the 
effectiveness of pollution control alone. Other relevant indicators are: 
ratio of costs over pollution reduction; share of costs for administrative 
purposes; success of international harmonization of policies and 
guidelines; satisfaction of citizens with the resulting policies; equity of 
cost burden and benefits; and many others. We received lots of 
anecdotal evidence for each of these criteria, but given our resources 
and time frame we were unable to do a valid and reliable policy 
evaluation on each indicator. The anecdotal evidence convinced us, 
however, that in each of these dimensions, the Great Lakes policy 
process was at least somewhat successful, with some notable 
exceptions. For example, the U.S. States and Canada failed to provide 
their sports-fisher with a common set of guidelines for fish 
consumption. The States and the Province of Ontario issued fish 
advisories that contain conflicting information and are based on 
different health standards. Although meant to reduce the risks of 
eating contaminated fish and to ensure the population that the agencies 
are concerned about public health, they added to the confusion of the 
local population and had a similar effect to the one caused by the 
confusion in Europe over food standards for radiation after the 
Chernobyl accident. It is difficult to understand why one is allowed to 
consume one type of fish in Michigan while being advised to avoid 
eating the same type of fish in Wisconsin. 
Whether a different policy structure would have resulted in a 
better outcome, cannot be answered here in any reliable way. It seems, 
however, that in comparison with other areas, the structure of an 
International Commission, assisted by a commission of agency 
representatives and a commission of scientific experts, was flexible 
enough to absorb new environmental demands and scientific 
knowledge and to translate these insights into practical policies. 
Furthermore, the political position of the IJC provided many incentives 
to the State and Provincial governments to follow the recommendations 
and take up their responsibility in planning their own policies. A 
problem, specifically for the Unites States, has been and continues to be 
the separation of policy making from policy implementation. The 
recommendations of the IJC do not necessarily take fiscal constraints 
into their account, although they try to anticipate them. The actual 
remedial programs are often ill-funded and are hampered by 
overlapping authorities and unclear responsibilities. 
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A common complaint from many groups in the United States and 
Canada was the allocation of the existing funds to different purposes. 
Although we were not able to obtain the exact share of funds for 
different purposes, we gained the impression that almost two thirds of 
all money is going into research, while one third is devoted to 
coordination, education, and remedial action (cf also Brickman and 
Ilgen 1982). The preference for research may indicate the remaining 
uncertainties about toxicological and epidemiological dose-effect 
relationships, but it can also be interpreted as a political strategy to 
please all constituents, the environmentalists as well as the 
industrialists, by spending money on research rather than on regulation 
or clean-ups. Research does not hurt anyone and is easy to initiate. This 
appeasement policy is only effective in the short term. If taxpayers 
find out that in spite of all the public money spent for environmental 
programs. the quality of the Lakes has not improved (only the 
knowledge about its pollution), they are likely to blame the politicians 
or the agencies for wasting public resources. Since the complaints about 
the emphasis on research spending were also raised by scientists who 
actually benefit from this system some re-allocation seems to be 
justified. 
The Great Lakes policy process also provides some insights into 
the efficacy of the two governmental approaches. The adversarial 
structure of the United States resulted in a multitude of actors, partially 
competing with each other and partially complementing each other. The 
more consensual approach in Canada provides a more streamlined 
process and more cooperative structure among the affected 
constituents. Although the Canadian structure with its logical flow and 
interdependencies seems to be more appealing at first glance 
(particularly from a European perspective), the U.S.-American "chaos· 
has also its advantages. As Prof. Boyer, one of the interview partners, 
pointed out. the U.S. approach enhances the resilience of the policy 
making procedure, creates a buffer zone between official politics and 
social interest groups, and provides a forum for many specialized 
constituents to voice their opinion and to be part of the process (cf. also 
Coppock 1986). Many new initiatives for the Great Lakes as well as new 
ideas or principles were originated in the United States rather than 
Canada. On the other hand, neither Boyer nor other interviewed 
persons denied that the U.S. procedure is more fragmented, that it can 
lead to the duplication of efforts, and that it is more time consuming 
than the policy process in Canada. Both systems have their advantages 
and disadvantages, but they may supplement each other well. The 
United States may contribute more in terms of incorporating public 
concerns and novel policy approaches into the policy formulation 
process, while the Canadian side may lead in terms of effective 
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implementation and local enforcement. Obviously it is neither possible 
nor desirable to export a country's regulatory style to another country, 
but joint efforts between countries can focus on the positive elements 
that each style has to offer. 
8. RECOMMENDATION 
8.1 Procedural Recommendations 
The Great Lakes. as a model for the Mediterranean Sea. has both 
advantages and disadvantages. In either case. the notion of transferring 
institutions and policy should be taken as a fluid adaptive process. 
While there are many differences between the Great Lakes and the 
Mediterranean Sea and the countries that border on their respective 
shores. the historical development of the cooperative process in the 
Great Lakes. and the institutional mechanisms that have evolved should 
provide insight into the enhancement of such a process for the 
Mediterranean Sea. Given the great number of countries that border 
the Mediterranean Sea and the differing levels of political and economic 
development as well as social environmental awareness. the 
decentralized approach to implementation would appear to be 
appropriate. 
From the perspective of the policy makers managing the 
Mediterranean Sea. it would appear that this decentralized 
implementation would be beneficial. With so many countries. each with 
a different agenda. political climate. economic strength, and social 
environmental awareness. this decentralized approach allows each 
country to implement the overall goals with a policy that is compatible 
with the above factors. At the same time. however, it is crucial that the 
implementation process is monitored and controlled by a centralized 
oversight committee, similar to the loint Commission of the Great Lakes. 
Some existing political bodies such as the European Community or the 
United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) might initiate such a 
move because both have been active in designing and implementing 
environmental protection programs for the Mediterranean region 
(Mediterranean Action Plans by UNEP and the Mediterranean Strategy 
and Action Plan by the European Community). 
Our suggestion would be to have an integrated policy program 
that defines the overall goals and objectives for the Mediterranean Sea 
and outlines a long term plan for accomplishing these goals. The plan 
should contain benchmarks of what has to be achieved in a specific 
time period. Such a plan should not be based on the present regulations 
which vary considerably between the affected countries, but should be 
anchored in a vision of a sustainable ecosystem and its imperatives. In 
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analogy to the Great Lakes program, different stages of environmental 
policies could be envisioned: the first stage being devoted to sewage 
water treatment and effluent reduction; the second stage to reducing 
ambient pollution from runoff and tributaries; the third stage to 
introducing a mass balance approach to stabilize the pollution cycle and 
the fourth stage to implementing an ecosystem management program. 
Many of the existing management plans such as the Environmental 
Regional Program initiated by the European Commission or the 
Environmental Program for the Mediterranean implemented by the 
World Bank and European Investment Bank have identified similar 
stages for the development of policy priorities (The World Bank and the 
European Investment Bank 1990). Considering the experiences with the 
four stages of clean-up in the Great Lakes Basin. it has proven prudent 
to keep all stages in mind from the beginning of a program. For 
example. some crucial elements of the fourth stage. such as land use 
management and presenation of bio-diversity. should be included in 
the program at an early stage since implementing these objectives may 
become excessively expensive over time. 
Another critical issue is funding. The major drawback of the U.S. 
program was the lack of sufficient funds to implement the objectives of 
the bi-national agreements. Furthermore. the setting of objectives 
without considering budget constraints is an invitation to political 
frustration. It is therefore essential to make funds available for the 
program prior to the specification of the policies. It is easy to come up 
with a wish-list that cannot be financed; budget constraints should be 
an integral part of the policy design. It appears that funding may not 
be as much of a problem for many environmental projects in the 
Mediterranean area since various organizations. including the World 
Bank and the European Investment Bank. have already committed 
considerable funds for the improvement and protection of the 
Mediterranean Sea. At the same time. however. it is imperative that 
such funding is put to the best possible use. This can only be done if all 
stakeholders. scientists. administrators. political. social. and industrial 
representatives are involved in the management process at an early 
stage. The continuation of funding should be made contingent on the 
accomplishments of the benchmark objectives for each time period 
specified in the various management plans. 
The distinction in remedial action plans and an integrated 
management plan as mandated by the International Agreements and 
controlled by the Joint Commission may also serve as a role model for 
the Mediterranean Sea. In accord with the 1975 Barcelona agreement 
on preserving the marine environment and establishing Mediterranean 
Action Plans (MAPs) and in the spirit of the Genoa Declaration of 1985 
with its list of policy priorities. areas of special concerns could be 
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identified and a policy process initiated in which local authorities, 
scientific advisors, and regional interest groups work together on a 
remedial action plan to either clean-up existing pollution or to preserve 
a unique ecosystem. The present activities of the European Commission 
to initiate an integrated management plan for coastal biotopes and to 
promote community action for the protection of the environment could 
be integrated into a more comprehensive policy making effort to 
establish a visionary plan for the whole area and to encourage local or 
regional authorities to design regional action plans in analogy to the 
RAPs in the Great Lakes Region. In acknowledgement of the fact that 
many initiatives from Brussels (EC) or Paris (UNEP) are bound to fail if 
the local and regional authorities do not cooperate, any effort should be 
made to convince the local constituents that environmental policies are 
in their own interest and serve their local economy in the long run. 
In addition to these regional projects, an overall management 
plan is essential to set target goals and to deal with translocal problems, 
in particular ambient water quality and ecosystem management. Such 
programs are difficult to implement because there is no immediate 
reward for the parties involved. One of the main lessons we learned 
from our interview partners was that environmental planning on a 
larger scale was only successful if it was integrated in the larger 
context of economic development. The vision of a clean industry 
structure in conjunction with an environment that would attract skilled 
workers as well as tourists constituted a powerful incentive for all 
parties to invest in environmental quality. The link between economic 
property and environmental quality has to be included in any 
environmental management plan. For example, the European 
Investment Bank already requires an assessment of major 
environmental impacts of all major projects that they fund. Commercial 
banks and industrial developers should follow their example. They may 
be motivated to do so if they feel that their economic concerns are also 
taken seriously by the environmental advocates and planners. To 
integrate the economic interests in the environmental management 
plans is necessary for two major reasons: First, the concerns of the 
industrial and the commercial sector can be addressed in the plan, thus 
avoiding a potential conflict, and, second, representatives of the 
business communities are given the opportunity to acknowledge the 
interdependency of ecological quality and economic prospects. 
Finally, the Great Lakes policy process can serve as an example of 
the important role of different parties in the formation and 
implementation of environmental policies. The international character 
of most scientific communities and the almost universal agreement on 
scientific methodology makes scientists the ideal group for establishing 
and promoting international agreements. The role of scientists, 
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however, is ambiguous. The more they are engaged in the policy arena, 
the more they lose credibility among their peers. In the u.s. context, 
many scientists who entered the political arena adopted a new role of 
being an advocate for a cause, thus substituting their scientific 
objectivity for loyalty to an interest group. Within the adversarial 
process in the United States, this shift to representing specific interests 
is counterbalanced by a political process in which all affected parties 
interact on the assumption that the struggle of the interest groups 
serves a catalyst for finding the true or best answer. Within the more 
cooperative European systems, the loss of scientific objectivity may be 
more detrimental since the policy process is more inspired by the 
"Common Good" approach in which all affected parties try to work on a 
consensual solution to a given problem (Bauman and Renn 1988; 
Q'Riordan and Wynne 1987). In this context, science serves a crucial 
role of integration as it provides limits for unreasonable claims and 
offers intersubjective assessments of likely impacts for each policy 
option (Coppock 1985). As the scientific community becomes more 
"americanized" in the sense that peer review and basic research 
accomplishments become more important factors for gaining prestige 
than formal titles and appointments (as it used to be in Europe). the 
danger is apparent that scientists either refrain from entering the 
policy arena or look for prestige by assuming an advocacy function. In 
either case, scientists cannot play the role for which they are most 
needed. It seems necessary therefore to provide special incentives for 
scientists who work on the larger picture and act as broker between 
the experimental scientists and the policy designers. 
In addition to the scientists, public interest groups can play a 
constructive and vital role in the policy formation process. They can 
serve as public watchdogs to make sure that local officials implement 
what they promise to do and can act as whistleblowers for 
environmental damage that has not yet been detected. The important 
lesson to learn from the Great Lakes is that these public interest groups 
are willing and capable of being constructive and rational in their 
policy demands. The stereotype of environmental groups as being 
NIMBY (not in my back yard) infected and fundamentally opposed to 
any kind of industrial development proved to be wrong in the case of 
Great Lakes United, the largest citizen group in the region. Such 
organizational behavior relies, however, on two conditions: First, the 
interest groups should incorporate many different citizen interests and 
understand themselves as an umbrella for a large segment of the 
population. Second, these groups have to be integrated in the policy 
process so that they can exercise responsibility for the policy outcomes 
they advocate rather than being relegated to the status of an 
unwanted opposition. 
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8.2 Institutional Recommendations 
The implementation of a procedure that includes the concerns 
and lessons mentioned above depends on the institutional structure. 
The Joint Commission was identified as the major institutional actor in 
the Great Lakes basin. Although we do not have enough data to 
evaluate the role of the Joint Commission thoroughly, the anecdotal 
evidence supports our impression that this structure is well-suited for 
dealing with a complex international issue. 
It seems therefore advisable that a similar structure be 
developed in the European context. We could imagine a Joint 
Commission for the Mediterranean Sea consisting of representatives of 
each EC bordering country and the Commission of the EC. Such a 
commission can only succeed if it is appointed by a high level political 
institution, either the national parliaments or the cabinets of each 
country. To avoid merely political appointees, candidates may be 
nominated by each ministry for environmental affairs or the respective 
national environmental protection agency and confirmed by the higher 
political level. It is also possible that an existing multi-government 
agency or institution may be adapted to serve this function. 
In analogy to the Great Lakes Joint Commission, the European 
Commission for the Mediterranean Sea should have two advisory 
boards: one with the senior representatives of the national 
administrations responsible for environmental policy making and 
implementation and one with senior scientists from the natural and 
social sciences. To attract senior scientists into this advisory board, the 
candidates should be nominated by each nation's academy of sciences 
and confirmed by the country's president or monarch . Even if this 
seems to be overdone, the crucial role of science in the environmental 
policy making process justifies substantial effort to assign sufficient 
prestige to this task. The German Academy of Sciences in West Berlin 
recently suggested the same procedure for a National Environmental 
Science Council (Umweltrat). 
In contrast to the Great Lakes Joint Commission we recommend 
that the European Joint Commission for the Mediterranean Sea be given 
a budget for creating the policies and implementing transnational 
policy measures. The local and regional remediation action plans should 
be primarily financed by the regions, but matching EC funds could help 
to initiate and promote the process and to control its outcome. Without 
having a budget to base policies on, the new Commission will not be 
taken seriously and will likely be producing wish-lists that cannot be 
financed. 
We also feel that the cooperative policy process in Europe 
requires the integration of major players into the policy process on the 
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regional and international level. In addition to the two major advisory 
boards. policies should be evaluated by invited stakeholder groups. 
such as industry. banks. unions. and other key political actors. Although 
such consultations prolong the overall process, they prevent the 
creation of a powerful opposition and --even more important-- link 
environmental policies with existing plans for economic development. 
On the regional and local level, citizen participation should be 
encouraged so that a broad consensus on the remedial action plans can 
be accomplished. Again the risk with such an approach is that the 
policy process does not move forward and that the necessary 
consultations consume all the energy and the financial resources of the 
region. Linking Federal or EC funds to a satisfactory result of the 
process, however, may serve as a powerful incentive to overcome this 
difficulty. 
The Great Lakes basin is certainly a unique region and both 
countries, The United Stdtes and Canada. are different in their political 
structure and culture from any of the European countries. Whether the 
policies that were successful in the Great Lakes area will also be 
successful in the European context is an open question. The 
recommendations here are meant as a first stimulus to think about 
procedures and institutional structures that have worked in another 
context and appear typical enough to be transferred to another region. 
More research and more case studies are necessary to confirm, modify 
or revise our conclusions. At this point, the recommendations are a 
reflection of an exploratory exercise rather than the results of a 
comprehensive scientific analysis. 
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